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Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players
can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These
opinions can be modified after each round by observing own or others payoff results but can be also
modified after interchanging impressions with other players. In this way, the update of the strategies
can become a question that goes beyond simple evolutionary rules based on fitness and become a
social issue. In this work, we explore this scenario by coupling a game with an opinion dynamics
model. The opinion is represented by a continuous variable that corresponds to the certainty of
the agents respect to which strategy is best. The opinions transform into actions by making the
selection of an strategy a stochastic event with a probability regulated by the opinion. A certain
regard for the previous round payoff is included but the main update rules of the opinion are given
by a model inspired in social interchanges. We find that the dynamics fixed points of the coupled
model is different from those of the evolutionary game or the opinion models alone. Furthermore,
new features emerge such as the independence of the fraction of cooperators with respect to the
topology of the social interaction network or the presence of a small fraction of extremist players.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory has been introduced as a
framework to study the processes of selection of genes
or behaviors in biological and social systems [1–3]. Its
aim is to characterize the choices in terms of strategies of
individuals of a population playing a game. A particular
strategy generates a payoff to the individual playing it
that depends on the selection of the rest of individuals.
The key assumption of the evolutionary theory is that
the fitness of an individual to reproduce directly relates
to the payoff obtained [1]. Consequently, most successful
strategies in terms of payoff are also those that multiply
faster and can eventually become dominant after some
generations.
These ideas find an analytical expression in the form of
the so-called replicator equation [4–6]. If xi stands for the
fraction of individuals in the population playing strategy
i, fi(~x) for their payoff and f¯(~x) for the average payoff
over all the population, the replicator equation reads
dxi
dt
= xi
(
fi(~x)− f¯(~x)
)
. (1)
The fixed points and limit cycles of the equation define
the final state of the system regarding the distribution of
strategies in the population [3–5, 7]. Moreover, the study
of the stability of the solutions, particularly if they are
formed by single strategies, to invasion by other strategies
motivates the definition of evolutionary stables strategies
(ESS) [7]. To illustrate the predictions of this approach,
one can consider the social dilemmas such as the public
goods game or the prisoner’s dilemma. In these games,
each individual must choose between collaborating with
her partners getting a intermediate value of the payoff or
to defect and try to take advantage of those partners that
are collaborating to gain a higher payoff. Despite collab-
oration is beneficial to the population as a whole, the
egoist inclination of each single individual to maximize
her payoff leads to generalized defection as the replica-
tor equation predicts since this is the only stable solution
[3, 4].
This result can seem a little drastic especially when
considered in the light of everyday experience in human
societies or the known behavior of social animals. Differ-
ent mechanisms have been proposed to explain how the
collaboration levels can increase in a population. One is,
for instance, taking into account the finite and discrete
character of the individuals in the population. This point
goes beyond the assumptions of the continuous theory
and provide thus a escape door to obtain more collabo-
ration or even to the invasion of collaborative individuals
in a full-defect population [8–10]. However, its efficiency
as an explanation does not extend to large systems since
the probability of survival or invasion of collaborative
strategies decreases fast with the population size. Other
possibility that has been theoretically discussed is that
structured populations may increas collaboration. Geo-
graphical extended systems simulated using spatial lat-
tices show a remanent level of collaboration [11–14] and
even chaotic patterns separating areas of collaborating
and defecting individuals [11]. The structure of social
networks enhances collaboration via the heterogeneity of
individual roles that the different positions in the network
produce [15–19]. Also random mutations or the individ-
uals’ free exploration to search for a best response to the
strategies of their counterparts are another element that
can promote collaboration [13, 20–23]. Finally, the fixed
points of the system dynamics, including the level of co-
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FIG. 1. Sketch showing the coupling between the opinion
variable φ and the probability of opting for one of the two
strategies in the game collaboration (C) or defection (D).
operations, are affected too by the way in which the sys-
tem updates either by taking into account discrete versus
continuous dynamics [24, 25] or by altering the update
rules [26–28].
In this work, we explore a mechanism that can also
play an important role to raise collaboration levels in so-
cial systems. The basic idea goes back to the fact that hu-
mans not always take the most rational option when pre-
sented with a dilemma [29–31]. This has been observed
in experiments in controlled environments in which par-
ticipants, in general students, were playing Prisoner’s
dilemma [32–37]. Also, in other level, it is a well known
behavior in the world of finances where decisions on buy-
ing and selling can be taken based on rumors or on a
general state of opinion about the possibilities of an in-
vestment [38]. Our proposal is to increase the dimension-
ality of the system by noting that the opinion on which is
the best strategy is an important variable to incorporate,
even though in some cases such belief can be wrong or
baseless with respect to actual performance in the game.
The evolution of the system includes thus a purely social
ingredient related to opinion formation [39] followed by a
process of decision taking that relies on the formed opin-
ion. In the abstract representation of Equation (1), the
addition of a variable of opinion can be modeled as
dxi
dt = g(φj , xi),
dφj
dt = h(
~φ, ~x),
(2)
where the index describing the opinion j can be contin-
uous or, as in this example, discrete, φj represents the
fractions of individuals holding opinion j, g() is a func-
tion that relates the opinion j with the probability of
playing strategy i and the function h() describes the evo-
lution of the opinions given the state of the system and
the outcome of the game. The addition of the new field φ
corresponding to the opinions of the individuals and the
new rules of update given by the interchange of opinions
between individuals can lead to extremely different fixed
points and solutions for this system. In the following,
we provide an example with a simple model that shows
how these ideas can be implemented in practice and how
the dynamic and stationary predictions of evolutionary
game theory can dramatically change due to the coupling
between opinion and games.
II. MODEL
We take as basis a well-known model for the opinion
dynamics, the Deffuant model [40], and a game inspired
by the dilemma of the tragedy of commons [41, 42]. The
opinion in the Deffuant model is described by a continu-
ous variable φ between −1 and 1. Considering a popula-
tion of N agents, each one placed on a node of a network,
the update of opinions is carried out by randomly choos-
ing an agent i and one of her neighbors j and comparing
their opinions at time t, φi and φj . If |φi − φj | < , the
interaction occurs and the new opinions are given by
φi(t+ 1) = φi + µ (φj − φi),
φj(t+ 1) = φj + µ (φi − φj). (3)
Otherwise, if the difference between φi and φj is larger
than , no interaction happens. The parameter µ is
the so-called convergence parameter since it regulates to
which new value the opinions converge after interaction.
In this work, we set it at µ = 1/2 which implies that the
final opinion is the average over both agents opinion. It is
important to stress that Deffuant’s model shows bounded
confidence in the sense that interactions between agents
whose opinions are further apart than  are forbidden.
The value of  is thus a key parameter to take into ac-
count in the following study.
For the game, we consider a simple set of rules that
permit the exploration of a dilemma and a harmony sce-
nario by tuning a single parameter. This allows us to
show the validity of our findings regardless of the game’s
ESS. In the rules every time that an agent i plays, she
does so with all her ki neighbors. An unit of wealth is
then distributed among all of them. If everybody co-
operates then the payoff is 1/ki for each agent. Other-
wise, each defector is given priority and takes a portion
p as payoff. If the total amount requested by the defec-
tors, p nDi , is larger than 1 nobody takes anything. On
the contrary, if p nDi ≤ 1, the cooperators evenly divide
the remaining 1 − p nDi . Note that for low values of p,
p < 1/ki, collaboration is the strategy with the largest
payoff and in a pure evolutionary framework becomes the
only survival. The same occurs on the other extreme for
high values of p, strictly speaking for p > 1 defection
has a zero payoff. In the area of intermediate p values,
the equilibria of our system are equivalent to that of the
public goods game and show the effects of the tragedy
of commons dilemma because defection is the most ad-
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FIG. 2. Time evolution of the average opinion and of the fraction of agents playing collaborate (fC) for the replicator dynamics,
the opinion dynamics alone and the coupled dynamics of game and opinion. The results are shown for three different values
of the parameter p: 0.1, 0.4 and 0.8. Note that C is the most advantageous strategy for p < 0.2, while the game becomes a
dilemma for p > 0.2. The bottom plots show the probability density for the opinion of the agents at the last time of simulation.
The simulations are run with a value of  = 1/2 and a population of N = 5000 agents.
vantageous strategy but if every agent opts for it none of
them get any payoff [41, 42].
After describing the opinion dynamics and the game
rules, it is important to explain how both are coupled.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the two extremes of the opin-
ion variable φ are identified with the strategies D and
C. φ represents thus the opinion of the agents about
which is the best strategy to win the game. The pass
from an agent’s opinion to real action is taken by as-
suming a probability pC = (1 + φ)/2 of playing C and
pD = 1 − pC = (1 − φ)/2 of choosing D. It is impor-
tant to stress that the game is actually played in a mixed
strategy framework and that this way of implementing
opinion and action is assuming incomplete information,
actions based on impressions and a social component in
the way the players move towards the selection of a strat-
egy. In practice, the model is updated by choosing a ran-
dom agent i in each time step, then she plays the game
with her neighbors and after this her opinion is updated
depending on the earned payoff. For updating the opin-
ions, a neighbor of i, j, is randomly selected and the new
opinions are calculated using Deffuant’s model of Eq. (3)
only if j’s payoff is equal or higher than i’s. Note that
only i’s opinion is updated, which introduces an asymme-
try in Deffuant’s rules. This asymmetry prevents players
that are doing better from changing opinion due to inter-
actions with other performing worse, and it also breaks
the strong conservation of the average opinion that is a
feature of the original Deffuant’s model.
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FIG. 3. Distribution of agent opinions and the average frac-
tion of collaborators fC as a function of p for different values
of the bounding parameter . In the first plots, A) and B),
the opinion update is based on the payoff obtained in the last
round of the game, while in C) and D) is based on the accu-
mulated wealth. In A) and C), p = 0.8. The total population
in the simulations is N = 5000.
III. RESULTS
Let us start by considering a mean-field situation in
which in each time step a randomly selected agent inter-
acts with a group formed by four other agents chosen at
random. The first results can be seen in Figure 2 where
the average opinion 〈φ〉 and the average fraction of co-
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FIG. 4. Influence of the topology of the interaction network on the outcome of the game. In A), the fraction of collaborators
fC as function of the parameter p. In B) and C) the opinion distribution for p = 0.1 and p = 0.8. Remember that the nature of
the game passes from a harmony game to public goods game dilemma at p = 0.2. In D) and E), maps showing the opinion and
strategy played in an instance of the game. And in F) and G, in the background in grey the agents’ opinion for a realization for
the game and the average opinion for 100 realizations as a function of the agents’ degree k. In all cases  = 1/2 and the sizes
of the systems are N = 1000 for all the systems except the 2D lattices that count with 32 × 32 = 1024 agents. The networks
are built with 〈k〉 ≈ 3.
operators fC are displayed as a function of time. The
curves of different colors correspond to three values of p:
p = 0.1, p = 0.4 and p = 0.8. For games with 5 partici-
pants, cooperation C is the most advantageous strategy
below p < 1/5 = 0.2. In general if the number of players
per game is n, the particular value of p for which C is
the best strategy is given by p < 1/n. Similar results to
those desribed next are found for any value of n as long as
the values of p are consitently updated. The blue curves
(p = 0.1) correspond thus to a harmony game, where the
C strategy becomes prevailing in the system from an evo-
lutionary perspective. This is actually the outcome when
the state of the system is updated following a replicator
dynamics (see plots on the left column of Figure 2). Oth-
erwise, for p > 0.2, the replicator dynamics results in a
final state formed mainly by defectors. The update based
only on the opinion dynamics, without allowing any cou-
pling between the payoff of the game and the update of
the opinions, leads to the selection of a few opinion val-
ues. These values of φ are separated more than 2  and
depend on the model initial conditions. The variability
of the initial conditions causes the slight dispersion in the
distributions P (φ). This is the known final state for the
Deffuant model [39, 40].
More interestingly, the combination of both game and
opinion dynamics on the right-hand plots produces a final
state that do not correspond with any of the fixed points
of the uncoupled dynamics. Although the defectors are
still a minority for p = 0.1 and a majority for the other
values of p, the dispersion of opinions is noticeable and a
small reservoir of agents with opinion opposite to the ma-
jority remains. The origin of this small group of agents
lies in the difference between the social and the evolu-
tionary dynamics. Bounded confidence prevents the in-
teraction of agents with very different opinion regardless
of their difference in payoff. The members of the small
group of roguish agents can play with any other agent
but they only update their opinion when confronted with
their own peers. This behavior would be eliminated in
an evolutionary framework, where the payoff and the fit-
ness are strictly related but this is not necessarily the
case in a social environment. Actually, this kind of stub-
bornness against facts has been observed in behavioral
economics where persons are asked to play a repeated
Prisoner’s dilemma. A fraction of the participants opted
for pure defection or even pure collaboration despite the
existence of more advantageous strategies such as tip for
tap or a Markovian response [33, 34, 36, 37]. These ex-
periments also show a continuous strategy exploration by
the participants that may not be so certain of their own
choices.
The fact that the small group of contrarian players
dissolves when the social constraints are relaxed can be
observed in Figure 3. In the plot A), the distribution of
agents’ opinions is displayed for different values of the
bound confidence parameter . If  is very low there is
very few interaction between agents and therefore the
opinions remain frozen in the initial condition, which is
an uniform distribution. When  increases, the agents are
able to interact with other players holding very different
opinions. This leads to the convergence of opinions to
values close to the extreme φ = −1, which corresponds
5to pure defection and that in the dilemma with evolu-
tionary dynamics is the only ESS. The players recognize
thus defection as the most adequate strategy in the limit
→ 2 but due to the stochastic nature of the relation be-
tween opinions and action are not able to reach φ = −1.
These results are stable within each of the two games to
the variation of the values of the portion taken by the
defectors p. The average fraction of cooperators fC can
be seen in Figure 3B as a function of p. For all the values
of , a change can be observed in p = 0.2 coinciding with
the modification of the nature of the game from harmony
to a dilemma. Apart from this, some minor corrections
are seen due to the discreteness of the group of players.
Since only 5 players are considered in each round and if
nD stands for the number of defectors in a round, the
total payoff reserved for the defectors is nD p. If this
amount goes over the unit neither defectors or collabo-
rators get any payoff. Therefore, the maximum number
of defectors that a round can sustain comply with the
relation nD p > 1. The values of p coinciding with 1/nD
mark thus a change on the payoff partition in the game.
A final detail that we also wanted to explore here is the
stability of the solutions if the total wealth is taken as
main factor of the opinion update instead of the instan-
taneous payoff. The use of the total wealth adds a more
consistent memory effect since the choice of a successful
strategy allows for a continuous income. Still the play-
ers are able to recognize the optimal strategy for large
values , but it is important to note the large dispersion
of opinions and the peak around φ ≈ −0.3 far from the
extreme φ = −1. Also the stability of the system with p
becomes altered with more violent bumps in fC when p
passes through the fractional values modifying the payoff
partition.
A simplistic mean-field configuration is not a valid
match to the more complicated structure that social in-
teractions can present. The social interactions are nor-
mally modeled as network whose vertices and edges rep-
resent individuals and social relations, respectively. In
theoretical works, it has been shown that the topologi-
cal characteristics of such networks can affect the game
outcome increasing, for instance, the level of coopera-
tion in the Prisoner’s dilemma [16, 18, 19]. However,
experimental results where real individuals play the Pris-
oner’s dilemma with different network topologies contra-
dict this conclusion since the level of cooperation seems
to be similar for different network topologies [33–37]. The
explanation provided for this effect is the presence of the
so-called moody conditional cooperators: individuals that
take their strategic decisions regarding cooperation or de-
fection based on their previous experience as much as on
their neighbors’ payoff. The results of our model point
in the same direction with a very weak dependence on
the topology of the interaction networks as can be seen
in Figure 4. In order to introduce different interaction
topologies, we run the model on a 2D square lattice, on
Erdo¨s-Renyi (ER) graphs [43] and on Barabasi-Albert
(BA) scale-free networks [44]. The ER and BA graphs
are particular types of complex networks with different
level of heterogeneity in the number connections of the
nodes (degree, k). For ER, the distribution of degrees
is Poissonian centered around the average 〈k〉, while for
the BA the distribution of degree is a power-law decaying
function with exponent −3, P (k) ∼ k−3. In each case,
an agent plays each round of the game with her nearest
neighbors alone. In Fig. 4A, the fraction of cooperators
fC is displayed as a function of the parameter p for differ-
ent network topologies and  = 1/2. The fraction of co-
operators is not very sensitive to the topology. One can
find a slightly stronger difference in the distribution of
opinions as can be seen in Figure 4B and C, where it can
be seen that a model with random interactions or scale-
free networks have more marked peaks. We have also
explored the spatial distribution of opinions and strate-
gies when the game is played in a 2D square lattice with 4
neighbors per node (Fig. 4D and E). As occurs with the
Prisoner’s dilemma in replicator dynamics [11], the re-
duced dimensionality allows for the formation of clusters
of agents with close opinions playing similar strategies.
The local character of the interactions makes that clus-
ters of collaborators can survive. In Figure 4, we explore
also the effect that the heterogeneity in the degree of the
agents in the social networks can have on the opinion.
The agents’ opinion in an instance and the average opin-
ion over many realizations is displayed as a function of
the agents degree (plots F and G). The average opinion
tends to be more negative, closer to defection, for better
connected agents regardless of the particular character-
istics of the network.
A final aspect of the model that we analyze is the ef-
fect that a small fraction of radical agents can have on
the opinion and strategies played by the rest of the pop-
ulation. There are two precedents that justify the con-
cern with the role that the extremists can play. One is
the existence of such radical individuals playing always
the same strategies either cooperation or defection in the
experiments [36, 37]. The second is that the effect of ex-
tremists, who go under the name of contrarians or zealots
in the literature, is well known in the opinion dynamic
models [45, 46]. A small fraction of extremists can drive
the system out of consensus. The fraction of cooperators
obtained with the model as a function of p and the opin-
ion distribution for p = 0.8 are depicted in Figure 5. The
curves for the model with a fraction of extremists of 5%
either of players C or D are over-imposed to the baseline
without extremists. As can be seen, the average fraction
of collaborators fC is weakly dependent on the presence
of extremists or zealots. Apart from a slight shift due
to the additional 5% players of pure strategies, no major
change is observed. However, the same cannot be said
regarding the opinion distributions. Both models with
extremists show different distributions even though the
effect is more dramatic if the zealots are playing ”defect”.
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FIG. 5. Effect of the introduction of zealots on the fraction
of collaborators fC shown in A) as function of p and on the
distribution of opinions for p = 0.8 in B). The model is sim-
ulated for a system of size N = 1000, with  = 1/2 and with
random interactions.
IV. DISCUSSION
In summary, we have introduced a model that cou-
ples opinion dynamics and strategies selection in a game.
Our main assumptions are that the agents have not cer-
tainty on which strategy is optimal and that they form
an opinion on this issue which can be updated by social
pressure. In particular, for the game we have selected
a model based on the rules proposed in the Tragedy of
Commons by G. Hardin that allows us to explore two pos-
sible final equilibria by tuning a single parameter p. For
p below 0.2, the rules of our system produce a scenario
that reminds a harmony game, while for p > 0.2 a social
dilemma equivalent to the public goods game is found.
For the opinion dynamics, we use Deffuant’s model that
is characterizes by having a continuous opinion variable φ
and a bounded confidence mechanism embodied by the
parameter . If the opinions of two agents are further
away than , no interaction is possible. We take advan-
tage of the continuous nature of φ to couple opinions and
actions via a mixed strategy model. The two available
strategies C and D become thus an action that is taken
with certainty only in the limits of opinion φ 1 and −1,
respectively. Any intermediate value of the opinion can
be translated into a probability of choosing C or D with
the bias towards the closest extreme in φ.
Once the coupling of opinion and game dynamics is
on, the outcome of the game changes. Of course, the
model is stochastic and so a certain amount of disper-
sion in the main descriptive variables is expected due to
the inherent randomness. However, variables such as the
average fraction of collaborators or the distribution of
opinion reach fixed points in the dynamic different from
the de-coupled systems that reflect the constraints that
opinion and game payoff put on each other. This effect
is enhanced when the parameter  is decreased imposing
a more strict bounded confidence regime. Cooperation
can thus be increased with a more social dynamics for
the evolution of the strategies but this is not the only
feature that calls for attention in our results. The pres-
ence of the variable of opinion allows the system to adapt
to different interaction topologies or to the existence of
extremist players in a very particular way. In correspon-
dence to the empirical observations, in the coupled model
the fraction of cooperators is not altered by the consid-
eration of different topologies or by the introduction of
extremists. It is the opinion distribution instead which is
modified to absorb the impact of the new conditions. In
the experiments, this phenomenon was explained by the
presence of moody players that have into account previ-
ous strategies when a new strategic decision was taken.
In our model this role is played by the memory effect
that the opinion variable provides. In this work, we have
selected particularly simple rules for the game and the
opinion dynamics. In order to gain further insights in
the decision process of real players more theoretical and
experimental work is needed. Nevertheless, the interplay
between opinion and actions and the fact that the opinion
gets updated by social pressure can significantly modify
the scenario in evolutionary games.
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